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COURSERA Business Model Canvas, Wk7-01 Application Video, The Nespresso Business Model

Wk7-01 Application Video, The Nespresso Business Model

Alex Osterwalder's advice that we must think like designers, and not fall in love with our first business model is wise. It's also very difficult to follow especially if you're innovating within an existing business, as most of us are. You have ingrained habits for creating and delivering value along your favorite dimension, forward or back. Your current business model, and it's profit logic, acts like a constant gravitational pull. That conforms your innovation to your way of creating, delivering and capturing value. Breaking free of that, gravitational pull is harder than it looks. It takes working like a designer. This gravitational pull has many causes. Clayton Christensen described the financial pull generated by the bias towards efficiency and sustained innovations, innovations that stay within the orbit of your known business and profit logic. Your brain also pulls you, in towards your existing business model. Your brain is biased in favor of your current beliefs. It ignores data that contradicts what you believe to be true about your customers, your market and your profits. Your brain is also motivated not to change your business model. Even when it's failing. Simply because you feel responsible for helping create the model. So, it turns out that innovation is not for the faint of heart. Or the faint of mind. The gravitational pull of our first, or our current, business model helps explain why so much innovation proceeds through painful trial and error. The trial and error is an unavoidable part of learning. The pain however, is mostly self-inflected. If we learn to experiment with our business model and learn as we innovate, we'll reduce the pain and the cost of innovating, while increasing our rates of success. » Consider the example of Nestle, among the largest of the world's food companies. Big, competitive, and ever conscious of controlling it's costs, Nestle held a dominant share of almost every industry category it served. In coffee, one of the world's largest and oldest commodities, Nestle dominated the instant coffee category. In the 1970s, Nestle's Nescafe brand held the dominant share of instant coffee market. They sold it to the mass market of retail consumers through retail stores that Nestle carefully cultivated with its retail partners. Nestle's relationship with its coffee customers, as with all of its package food customers was an arms length relationship of retail transactions. These retail sales generated low margin revenues. So, Nestle focused on innovating in production and marketing in order to make its manufacturing plants efficient, and its portfolio of products strong. Like all commodity businesses, costs were tightly managed and controlled. The only problem with Nestle's dominance of instant coffee was that instant coffee was one of the smaller coffee categories. Roast and ground coffee, made in coffee makers of all types was over twice the size. Roast and ground coffee accounted for 70% of all the coffee consumed in the world. But Nestle was fourth in the roast in ground market. Eager to find ways into the roast in ground market, in 1974 Nestle bought the rights to commercialize a new type of espresso brewing system that used pods of coffee to brew individual servings. Once they have perfected and patented the machine, which they eventually named an Espresso, Nestle set their sights on Espresso consumers and on the existing channels to those Espresso drinkers. The cafes and restaurants where the majority of consumers drank Espresso. The Nespresso machine was compact in size, and its pod brewing process was clean and easy to use. You would've thought that restaurants and cafes would have loved it. But like many an innovator's assumption, this one proved to be false. Nestle had never marketed machines to restaurants or cafes. Once they did they discovered that the barista's viewed the machines as a threat to their livelihood. And that the restaurant kitchens didn't need the space savings, and were not willing to pay higher prices for the cleaner and easy to brew servings. [SOUND] In other words Nestle's first business model flopped [SOUND]. In 1986, sensing that the gravitational pull of its existing business model and profit logic was about to kill the struggling innovation, Nestle set up a separate Skunk Work company in a separate building to continue incubating espresso. The new venture expanded its customer segments to include the office market, and partnered with a coffee machine maker who was focused on the same market segment. But this too, flopped. [SOUND] What's an innovator to do? You can think of all these attempts by Nestle as experiments. Each of the experiments gave Nestle an opportunity to learn. Imagine that you're on the team of Nespresso. You've learned that your cafe, restaurant, and office model for the Nespresso business is not working. What are you going to do next?

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Wk7-01 Application Video, The Nespresso Business Model

Alex Osterwalder's advice that we must think like designers, and not fall in love with our first business model is wise. 私たちがデザイナーのように考えなければならず、私たちの最初のビジネスモデルに恋をしないというAlexOsterwalderのアドバイスは賢明です。 It's also very difficult to follow especially if you're innovating within an existing business, as most of us are. また、私たちのほとんどがそうであるように、既存のビジネス内でイノベーションを起こしている場合は特に、フォローするのは非常に困難です。 You have ingrained habits for creating and delivering value along your favorite dimension, forward or back. あなたは、あなたの好きな次元に沿って、前進または後退して価値を創造し、提供するための習慣を根付いています。 Your current business model, and it's profit logic, acts like a constant gravitational pull. あなたの現在のビジネスモデル、そしてそれは利益の論理であり、絶え間ない引力のように機能します。 That conforms your innovation to your way of creating, delivering and capturing value. これは、イノベーションを価値の創造、提供、獲得の方法に適合させます。 Breaking free of that, gravitational pull is harder than it looks. それから抜け出すと、引力は見た目よりも難しくなります。 It takes working like a designer. This gravitational pull has many causes. この引力には多くの原因があります。 Clayton Christensen described the financial pull generated by the bias towards efficiency and sustained innovations, innovations that stay within the orbit of your known business and profit logic. Your brain also pulls you, in towards your existing business model. あなたの脳はまた、あなたをあなたの既存のビジネスモデルに引き込みます。 Your brain is biased in favor of your current beliefs. あなたの脳はあなたの現在の信念に有利に偏っています。 It ignores data that contradicts what you believe to be true about your customers, your market and your profits. それはあなたがあなたの顧客、あなたの市場そしてあなたの利益について真実であるとあなたが信じていることと矛盾するデータを無視します。 Your brain is also motivated not to change your business model. あなたの脳はまたあなたのビジネスモデルを変えないように動機づけられています。 Even when it's failing. 失敗しても。 Simply because you feel responsible for helping create the model. モデルの作成を支援する責任があると感じているからです。 So, it turns out that innovation is not for the faint of heart. ですから、イノベーションは気の弱い人向けではないことがわかります。 Or the faint of mind. The gravitational pull of our first, or our current, business model helps explain why so much innovation proceeds through painful trial and error. 私たちの最初の、または現在のビジネスモデルの引力は、なぜこれほど多くのイノベーションが苦痛な試行錯誤によって進行するのかを説明するのに役立ちます。 The trial and error is an unavoidable part of learning. 試行錯誤は学習の避けられない部分です。 The pain however, is mostly self-inflected. しかし、痛みはほとんど自己影響します。 If we learn to experiment with our business model and learn as we innovate, we'll reduce the pain and the cost of innovating, while increasing our rates of success. 私たちがビジネスモデルを実験し、革新しながら学ぶことを学べば、成功率を高めながら、革新の苦痛とコストを削減できます。 » Consider the example of Nestle, among the largest of the world's food companies. Big, competitive, and ever conscious of controlling it's costs, Nestle held a dominant share of almost every industry category it served. 大きく、競争力があり、コストを管理することを常に意識しているネスレは、サービスを提供するほぼすべての業界カテゴリで圧倒的なシェアを占めていました。 In coffee, one of the world's largest and oldest commodities, Nestle dominated the instant coffee category. In the 1970s, Nestle's Nescafe brand held the dominant share of instant coffee market. They sold it to the mass market of retail consumers through retail stores that Nestle carefully cultivated with its retail partners. 彼らは、ネスレが小売パートナーと慎重に栽培した小売店を通じて、小売消費者のマスマーケットにそれを販売しました。 Nestle's relationship with its coffee customers, as with all of its package food customers was an arms length relationship of retail transactions. ネスレとコーヒーの顧客との関係は、すべてのパッケージ食品の顧客と同様に、小売取引の独立企業間関係でした。 These retail sales generated low margin revenues. これらの小売売上高は低マージンの収益を生み出しました。 So, Nestle focused on innovating in production and marketing in order to make its manufacturing plants efficient, and its portfolio of products strong. そのため、ネスレは、製造工場を効率的にし、製品ポートフォリオを強力にするために、生産とマーケティングの革新に注力しました。 Like all commodity businesses, costs were tightly managed and controlled. すべてのコモディティビジネスと同様に、コストは厳重に管理および管理されていました。 The only problem with Nestle's dominance of instant coffee was that instant coffee was one of the smaller coffee categories. Roast and ground coffee, made in coffee makers of all types was over twice the size. すべてのタイプのコーヒーメーカーで作られた焙煎して挽いたコーヒーは、2倍以上のサイズでした。 Roast and ground coffee accounted for 70% of all the coffee consumed in the world. 焙煎して挽いたコーヒーは、世界で消費されるすべてのコーヒーの70%を占めています。 But Nestle was fourth in the roast in ground market. しかし、ネスレは地上市場でのローストで4位でした。 Eager to find ways into the roast in ground market, in 1974 Nestle bought the rights to commercialize a new type of espresso brewing system that used pods of coffee to brew individual servings. 地上市場での焙煎への道を模索することを熱望したネスレは、1974年に、コーヒーのポッドを使用して個々のサービングを醸造する新しいタイプのエスプレッソ醸造システムを商品化する権利を購入しました。 Once they have perfected and patented the machine, which they eventually named an Espresso, Nestle set their sights on Espresso consumers and on the existing channels to those Espresso drinkers. ネスレは、最終的にエスプレッソと名付けたマシンを完成させて特許を取得すると、エスプレッソの消費者と、エスプレッソを飲む人への既存のチャネルに目を向けました。 The cafes and restaurants where the majority of consumers drank Espresso. 消費者の大多数がエスプレッソを飲んだカフェやレストラン。 The Nespresso machine was compact in size, and its pod brewing process was clean and easy to use. ネスプレッソマシンはコンパクトなサイズで、ポッドの醸造プロセスはクリーンで使いやすいものでした。 You would've thought that restaurants and cafes would have loved it. But like many an innovator's assumption, this one proved to be false. Nestle had never marketed machines to restaurants or cafes. Once they did they discovered that the barista's viewed the machines as a threat to their livelihood. 彼らがやった後、彼らはバリスタが機械を彼らの生活への脅威と見なしていることを発見しました。 And that the restaurant kitchens didn't need the space savings, and were not willing to pay higher prices for the cleaner and easy to brew servings. [SOUND] In other words Nestle's first business model flopped [SOUND]. In 1986, sensing that the gravitational pull of its existing business model and profit logic was about to kill the struggling innovation, Nestle set up a separate Skunk Work company in a separate building to continue incubating espresso. The new venture expanded its customer segments to include the office market, and partnered with a coffee machine maker who was focused on the same market segment. But this too, flopped. [SOUND] What's an innovator to do? You can think of all these attempts by Nestle as experiments. Each of the experiments gave Nestle an opportunity to learn. Imagine that you're on the team of Nespresso. You've learned that your cafe, restaurant, and office model for the Nespresso business is not working. What are you going to do next?